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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether there is a link between financing costs and international trade 
patterns, and if so, whether this link is determined by the strength of trade and financial ties between 
trading partners. The potential importance of these considerations stems from the fact that 
approximately half of world trade is conducted on credit; a supplier gives to its foreign buyer a trade-
financing loan financed by commercial banks on both sides of the transaction. For buyers, especially in 
developing countries, trade-financing loans from foreign suppliers are an essential source of external 
finance for international trade. We find that, first, with respect to price, the industry-level evidence 
indicates that financing costs determine international trade patterns, whereby for each industry the 
pass-through rates of exchange-rate changes into import prices are positively correlated with the 
industry's dependence on external-finance and trade-credit use. Second, with respect to volume, the 
country-level evidence suggests that between trading partners, the volume of trade-financing loans 
depends positively on the stronger trade and financial ties, including the higher value of total imports, 
the higher degree of product differentiation in imports, and the higher value of banking claims. 
Interestingly, investigation on trade-financing loans during periods of systematic banking crises 
suggests that the links between financing costs and international trade patterns also depend on 
characteristics of the loan arrangements (i.e. maturity), the size of the commercial banks (i.e. money-
center, large, or small), and type of creditors (i.e. commercial bank or official). 
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Is there a link between financing costs and international trade patterns? For example, 
considering a firm's purchasing of an imported good: one firm could pre-buy for future delivery, while 
another spot-buy for immediate delivery. Intuitively, if both use the same mode of transportation, the 
former would have higher financing costs since the firm has to pay in advance, but it should be better 
for hedging against the variability of import prices. So, does a firm in an industry which faces high 
financing costs because it requires extensive external finance have less control over the variability of 
prices of its imported goods when faced with exogenous shocks such as movements in exchange rates 
or changes in tariff and non-tariff measures, than a firm in an industry which requires little external 
finance? 
Approximately half of world trade is conducted on credit; a supplier gives to its foreign buyer 
a trade-financing loan financed by commercial banks on both sides of the transaction. For buyers, 
especially in developing countries, trade-financing loans from foreign suppliers are an essential source 
of external finance. How then does a disruption in a country’s financial system affect this source of 
external finance? For example, should a country with stronger trade and financial ties with its trading 
partners be less affected by disruptions in its financial system because it might be better in securing 
trade-financing loans?
1 
In short, how important is the link between financing costs and international trade, and what 
are the implications for the conduct of monetary and international trade policy? Is there a link between 
financing costs and international trade patterns? And if so, is it determined by the strength of trade and 
financial ties between trading partners? 
                                                           
1 This interest essentially comes after observing that following a turbulent period in financial sector such as debt- and financial 
crisis, a debtor country tends to have difficulty in continuing normal operation of its international trade. For example, Anne O. 
Krueger (2002) emphasizes the necessity of a debt restructuring mechanism that would facilitate the provision of trade-financing 
need of a debtor country in order to limit the degree of economic dislocation. Empirical work seems consistent with the concern 
that disruption in a country’s financial sector adversely affects its international trade. For example, on the basis of data from 217 
countries between 1948 and 1997, Andrew K. Rose (2003) concludes that: “international default has negative consequences for 
trade.” Nevertheless, his study simply suggests correlation, but not a channel through which financing costs of a country affect 
its international trade. As Rose puts it: “It seems clear that there are reasons to believe that sovereign default may lead to a 
decline in international trade, either as a punishment for and deterrent to further default, or simply because of more costly trade 
finance and/or insurance.” This paper advances his findings by investigating a channel through which a country’s financing costs 
affect its international trade patterns.   3
This paper seeks to answer these questions by considering two sets of evidence. First, We use 
the U.S. industry data disaggregated at four-digit level on a firm’s external-finance use and import 
prices to test whether the pass-through rates of exchange-rate changes are determined by an industry’s 
financing costs. With respect to price, the industry-level evidence indicates that financing costs 
determine international trade patterns, whereby for each industry the pass-through rates of exchange-
rate changes into import prices are positively correlated with the industry's dependence on external-
finance and trade-credit use.  Essentially, this implies that financing costs may also influence the 
response of international trade patterns to changes in international trade policy (i.e. import tariffs, anti-
dumping duties) and monetary policy (i.e. dollarization, interest rate). 
Second, We use data on trade-financing loans from the U.S. commercial banks, and from the 
G7-creditors, to examine whether the strength of trade and financial ties could explain the amount of 
trade-financing loans between trading partners. We find that the volume of trade-financing loans 
depends positively on the value of total imports, the degree of product differentiation in imports, and 
the value of banking claims. Interestingly, our investigation on trade-financing loans during periods of 
systematic banking crises suggests that the links between financing costs and international trade 
patterns also depend on characteristics of the loan arrangements (i.e. maturity), size of the commercial 
banks (i.e. money-center, large, or small), and type of creditors (i.e. commercial bank or official).  
This paper follows a literature that emphasizes the association between real and financial 
linkages (Andrew K. Rose and Mark M. Spiegel (2002), Kristin J. Forbes and Menzie D. Chinn 
(2003)). The main conclusion of this paper is that there are economically important links between 
financing costs and international trade patterns, and that these links are determined by trade and 
financial ties between trading partners. 
This paper starts with a theoretical underpinning which is used to organize data for basic tests 
in section 2. In section 3, I set up the econometric tests and discuss the results. Section 4 concludes. 
   4
1. Theoretical underpinnings: trade and financial ties hypothesis 
In a simple arrangement of international-trade transactions, after a supplier contracts to supply 
goods to a foreign buyer, there is a parallel trade-financing loan agreement in which a bank lends on 
behalf of the supplier to the foreign buyer’s bank
2. Normally, the loan is guaranteed by an export-credit 
agency of the supplier’s country and/or a lead bank, if the loan is syndicated. 
We argue that under the buyer’s limited commitment to repay, the total amount of trade-
financing loans is determined by strength of trade and financial ties between the supplier/creditor 
country and the buyer/borrower country. Specifically, the amount of trade-financing loans depends on 
the following: 
  positively on the value of total imports by the buyer country, 
  positively on the value of banking claims with the buyer country, and 
  on the degree of product differentiation in total imports, with the direction of the association 
determined by characteristics of the loan arrangements (i.e. maturity), size of the commercial 
banks (i.e. money-center, large, or small), and type of creditors (i.e. commercial bank or 
official). 
We label this the “trade and financial ties hypothesis.” The basic intuition behind this 
hypothesis, and the formal model focusing on international exchange characterized by separation 
between the quid and the quo such as trade-financing loan, contracts for future delivery, collateral, and 
insurance, is found in Appendix B. 
 
2. The basic tests 
The trade and financial ties hypothesis in the previous section sets the framework to examine 
empirically the links between financing costs and international trade patterns. Our next step is to 
investigate whether there is a link between financing costs and international trade patterns, and if so, 
                                                           
2 Stylized facts of trade financing are found in Appendix A. Figure A illustrates details and time-line of standard trade-financing 
arrangement.   5
whether this link is determined by trade and financial ties between trading partners. I proceed by 
setting up basic tests on two sets of data. 
2.1 The First Test: Financing Costs and Pass-Through into Import Prices 
The objective is to test whether the pass-through rates of exchange-rate changes into import 
prices are determined by each industry’s financing costs. If so, there is a link between financing costs 
and international trade patterns. More importantly, such a link implies that financing costs could also 
determine the response of international trade patterns to changes in international trade- and monetary 
policy. 
The most disaggregated and comprehensive data on each industry’s use of external-finance 
that can be linked with import prices is available only for the U.S.’s manufacturing industries
3. I use 
the basic econometric specification that is closely related to standard exchange-rate pass-through 
estimation, with a modification, to address what we are looking for: for each industry, the correlation 
between the pass-through rates of exchange-rate changes into import prices and the industry’s 
financing costs. 
Theoretically, financing costs use should be positively correlated with the pass-through rates. 
In purchasing an imported good, the firm could pre-buy for future delivery or spot-buy for immediate 
delivery. The former would imply higher financing costs since the firm has to pay in advance, but 
would be a better hedge against the variability of import prices
4. Thus, the disconnection between 
changes in import prices and exchange rates should be more likely for an industry that faces low 
financing costs with little need for external-finance use. Hence, if we can measure the industry’s 
                                                           
3 Using only the U.S. data raises a question on whether the evidence from the U.S. industries is a good representative for 
industries in other countries. The response to this question is, given that the U.S.’s capital market is more developed than most 
countries, the U.S. firms are less financially constrained, implying that the findings, if any, of the correlation between industry’s 
external-finance use and the rates of exchange-rate pass-through into import prices can be ‘a lead evidence’ of the link between 
international trade and financing costs in other countries. In other words, using the U.S.-industry evidence simply biases against 
any finding of the link between financing costs and international trade patterns. 
4 See Joshua Aizenman (2003) where it is shown in a formal model that higher financing costs can increase the cost of pre-
buying imports, reducing thereby the frequency of pricing to market and the expected deviation from relative purchasing power 
parity. It should be noted that this study investigates only import pricing behavior. For many developing countries that are highly 
dependent on exports of one primary commodity, there is also cost associated with export price fluctuations. See, for example, 
Kenneth M. Kletzer et al. (1992), for a study on the role of conventional instruments for smoothing primary exporters’ price 
risks, including loans and futures contracts, in the presence of sovereign risk and capital shortages.    6
financing costs, we should expect a positive interaction between the industry’s financing costs and 
exchange rate changes. 
In order to focus on the interaction between exchange-rate changes and the industry’s 
financing costs, I modify the standard exchange-rate pass-through estimation by including the 
interaction effects of exchange rates with a measure of external-finance use, and controlling variables 
thought to influence pass-through rates across industries. The dependent variable is the industry-
disaggregated import price index, pooled across industries and time periods. Let j denotes industry and 
t denotes time period, the estimating equation, with all variables transformed to natural logs, is given 
by: 
(1)  Import Prices t j,  
=  ⋅ 1 β Lagged Import Prices t j,  +  ⋅ 2 β Exchange Rates t  
+  ⋅ 3 β (Exchange Rates t ×Volatility of Exchange Rates t ) 
+  ⋅ 4 β (Exchange Rates t ×Industry j’s Concentration) 
+  ⋅ 5 β (Exchange Rates t ×Industry j’s Financing Costs) 
+  ⋅ 6 β Industry j’s Inventory to Shipments t  +  t j, ε  
It should be noted that this approach of estimating exchange-rate pass-through has one 
advantage over other specifications of pass-through estimation. By focusing on differences across 
industries based on interactions between exchange rates and variables thought to influence the pass-
through rates, this approach can estimate the correlation between the rates of pass-through and 
controlling variables without using two-stage estimation. Thus, unlike previous studies, it is less 
subject to an econometric issue of weighted least squares
5. 
                                                           
5 Previous studies on exchange rate pass-through use the two-stage regression technique whereby, (1) pass-through elasticities 
are estimated for each series of import prices (industries, countries), and (2) weighted least squares method is implemented by 
using the inverse of the standard error of pass-through elasticity estimates from the first stage as weights to allow for 
heteroskedasticity for the first stage pass-through elasticities. See, for example, Jaiwen Yang (1997) on a link between and 
exchange rate pass-through and degree of product differentiation, and Jose Manuel Campa and Linda S. Goldberg (2003), on   7
Variables and their source of data are reported in Appendix D. Two simple correlations (not 
reported) are noteworthy. First, the simple correlation shows that an industry that is highly dependent 
on external-finance use is also highly dependent on trade-credit use: the correlation between the two 
variables for all U.S. companies in the 1980’s is 0.38 and statistically significant at 5-percent level. 
Second, an industry with high level of industry inventory to shipments tends to be highly dependent on 
external-finance use. 
 
2.2 The Second Test: Trade and Financial Ties and Volume of Trade-Financing Loans  
The objective here is to examine whether between trading partners the amount of trade 
financing loan depends on trade and financial ties. For buyers, especially in developing countries, 
trade-financing loans from foreign suppliers are an essential source of external finance for international 
trade. In particular, it is important to investigate how a disruption in a country’s financial system such 
affects this source of external finance. Results from this test should suggest whether a link between 
financing costs and international trade patterns depends on trade and financial ties between trading 
partners. 
The simple econometric specification is as follows: The dependent variable is the amount of 
trade-financing loans a borrower (importer) country receives from a creditor (foreign supplier) country.  
The key explanatory variables include measures of trade and financial ties between trading partners. In 
order to investigate the response of trade-financing loans to trade and financial ties during periods of 
disruption in a borrower country’s financial system, I include the interaction effects between the 
indicator of a financial disruption and measures of trade and financial ties. Let i denotes borrower 
countries and, as before, t denotes time periods. Let [] ′ •  be a row vector of explanatory variables, and 
k Θ  be a column vector of coefficients. The estimating equation is given by: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
how exchange rate pass-through across OECD countries are determined by microeconomic factors (e.g. industry composition of 
a country’s import bundle) and macroeconomic factors (e.g. inflation and volatility of exchange rates).   8
(2) Trade-Financing  Loansi,t 
=  ⋅ 0 θ Financial-Disruption Indicatori,t 
+ [ Trade and Financial Ties]′ i,t 1 Θ ⋅  
+ [ Trade and Financial Ties × Financial-Disruption Indicator]′ i,t 2 Θ ⋅  
+ [ Controlling Variables]′ i,t 3 Θ ⋅  
To deal with the non-zero nature
6 of the observations on the amount of trade-financing loans, 
I estimate the above equation with the pooled Tobit regression
7, with all variables in natural logs, 
including controlling variables thought to determine trade-financing loans between trading partners. Of 
course, we need appropriate measures of trade and financial ties and the indicator of financial-
disruption periods. This is what we will examine shortly
8. 
Variables and their source of data are reported in Appendix D. Tables 4 and 5 report statistics 
of the trade-financing loans data. Several points are noteworthy. First, from 1997 to 2002, Korea and 
Brazil not only proportionally received large trade credits from the U.S. commercial banks, but they 
also received trade credits in excess of total imports from the United States. Second, most of trade 
credits from G7 to low-income countries were from the official creditor (i.e., Senegal:85%, 
Mongolia:76%). We also find that the correlation (not reported) between the value of banking claims 
                                                           
6 When an observation on trade-financing loan is equal to zero, it might not be the issue of data observability as in the general 
data-censoring problem. Suppose that the volume of trade-financing loans is an observable outcome: a trade-financing loan takes 
on the value zero with positive probability, but is a continuous random variable over strictly positive values. One can think of a 
borrower/importer and a creditor/foreign supplier solving an optimization problem, in which for some periods the optimal choice 
will be zero trade-financing loan (a corner solution). 
7 Computationally, this estimation technique applies standard Tobit regression to a data set as if it was a one long cross section of 
size equals to number of panels×periods of time. 
8 Andrew K. Rose and Mark M. Spiegel (2002) investigate causality between a country’s bilateral borrowing and bilateral trade 
with its creditors. They show that a volume of bilateral borrowing is higher between countries with stronger trade ties. However, 
the skeptic could still offer a number of arguments against causality. First, although Rose and Spiegel solve a possibility that 
international borrowing and trade could be driven by a common factors by using instrumental variables, in the absence of a well-
accepted theory of a link between a country’s financing costs and its international trade, the set of their instruments thought to be 
important to international trade but not international borrowing patterns may not include a large number of potential omitted 
variables. Second, from their claim, though intuitive and suggestive, it is difficult to draw on an example and policy implication 
between a country’s financing costs and its international trade pattern. Empirical work that links directly a channel through 
which financing costs of a country influences its international trade is essential in order to advance a discussion on real and 
financial linkages, and, in particular, the immediate concern on the links between international trade and financial system (e.g. 
whether a country services its debt obligation because it wants to avoid losing trade financing (Jeremy I. Bulow and Kenneth 
Rogoff (1989)), or to preserve its good reputation (Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (1981), Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. 
Wright (2000), or to avoid from collusive punishment from international banks (Mark J. Wright (2002))). This paper makes 
progress on causality between trade and finance by focusing on the mechanics of trade-financing, a channel through which a 
country’s financing costs may potentially influence its international trade patterns.   9
and imports are high and statistically significant (0.5 and 0.8 in the case of the U.S.’s banks and the G-
7 creditors, respectively), consistent with the findings of Andrew K. Rose and Mark M. Spiegel (2002) 
to the effect that a volume of bilateral borrowing is higher between countries with stronger trade ties. 
 
3. The hidden links 
3.1 Pass-Through Rates Are Positively Correlated with Financing Costs 
3.1.1 Results from Dependence on External-Finance Use 
I start by using Dependence on External-Finance Use as a measure of an industry’s financing 
costs. As can be seen from Table 2, the coefficient estimates on the interactions between Dependence 
on External-Finance Use and Exchange Rates are all statistically significant. However, their signs vary 
for different categories of the U.S. companies. This can be the case when old firms in a low pass-
through industry have lower external-finance use (face lower financing costs) than old firms in a high 
pass-through industry, but a pattern of external-finance use of young firms is reversed. If anything, this 
result suggests interesting linkages between international trade, monetary policy and credit markets. 
Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan (1995) show that creditors in concentrated credit markets 
have an assurance of obtaining future surplus from the firm, and consequently accept lower returns up 
front, so that in credit markets young firms who get institutional loans (bank loans) are more indebted 
in concentrated credit markets than in competitive credit markets, but this pattern reverses for older 
firms since the older firms, having few investment opportunities and being faced high interest rates, 
tend to use less external finance
9. 
One way to get a sense of magnitude of the coefficient estimates is as follows: The industry at 
the 4
th quartile (highest dependent) of Dependence on External-Finance Use is Special Industry 
Machinery. The industry at the 1
st quartile (lowest dependent) is Instruments for Testing of Electrical 
                                                           
9 See also Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2001) for a survey on how relationship-based (bank-dominated) and arm’s 
length (market-based) financial system can have different effects on industrial structure and growth.   10
Signals. Using the Dependence on External-Finance Use of old firms in the 1980’s, the coefficient 
estimate then predicts that pass-through of 1 percent exchange rate changes into import prices of the 
Special Industrial Machinery should be 0.577 percent higher than the Instruments for Testing of 
Electrical Signals industry. 
 
3.1.2 Results from Dependence on Trade-Credit Use 
As can be seen from Table 3, the coefficient estimates of the interactions between Exchange 
Rates and Dependence on Trade-Credit Use are all positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent 
level
10.  
A sense of magnitude of the coefficient estimates is given as follows. The industry at the 4
th 
quartile (highest dependent) of Dependence on Trade-Credit Use is Electrical Machinery, Equipment, 
and Supplies. The industry at the 1
st quartile (lowest dependent) is Construction Machinery and 
Equipment. Using the stock measure of Dependence on Trade-Credit Use of firms in the 1980’s, the 
coefficient estimate then predicts that pass-through of 1 percent exchange rate changes into import 
prices of the Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies industry should be 0.054 percent higher 
than the Construction Machinery and Equipment industry. 
These results are interesting for both practical and intellectual reasons. The immediate 
practical concern is that while the literature on open-economy macroeconomics focuses on how firm 
pricing behavior (in particular, pricing to market behavior, market power, and product differentiation) 
affects the conduct of monetary policy, the results presented here suggest that dependence on external-
finance use and industry financing costs are also important. The intellectual interest of these results is 
that they offer evidence on the role of financing costs in international trade. In recent years, researchers 
have been concerned with how firms’ dynamics such as pricing and productivity influence patterns of 
                                                           
10 Although the estimation does not use measures of Dependence on Trade-Credit Use from different categories of firms (i.e. 
young firms and old firms), it is unlikely to observe opposite patterns of the correlation between pass-through rates and trade-
credit use across firm age as we did when we use measures of Dependence on External-Finance Use. Using firm-level data, 
Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan (1995) find that although the decision to offer trade credits depends upon the 
firm’s quality, the decision by trade creditors to offer early payment discount does not vary with firm size or firm age.   11
international trade. The evidence in this paper suggests a possible channel through which finance and 
capital markets might have influential impact on international trade patterns. 
 
3.2 Trade and Financial Ties Determine Volume of Trade-Financing Loans 
3.2.1 Varying the U.S.-Commercial Bank Size 
With the data on trade-financing loans from the U.S. commercial banks, we are able to 
investigate whether the correlations between trade-financing loans and trade and financial ties vary 
across bank size. Using the data on trade-financing loans from the U.S. money-center banks, Table 6 
reports the coefficient estimates on the measures of Trade and Financial Ties with and without 
interactions with Financial-Disruption Indicator.  
As can be seen in the first and second column of Table 6, the coefficient estimates on Value of 
Total Imports, Value of Banking Claims, and Degree of Product Differentiation in Imports, are positive 
and statistically significant.
11,12 The coefficient on Financial-Disruption Indicator is negative, but not 
significant. The coefficient estimate of the interaction between Financial-Disruption Indicator and 
Degree of Product Differentiation in Imports is negative and statistically significant at the 1-percent 
level. 
For panel data, where both cross-section and time-period are large, there could be the problem 
of cointegration in the panel estimation (see for example M. Hashem Pesaran and Ron Smith (1995) 
and Peter C. B. Phillips and Hyungsik R. Moon (1999)). In the context of trade-financing loans in this 
study, the existence of cointegration would probably mean that trade-financing loans across borrower 
countries are highly correlated over time. In other words, if one has a prior that trade-financing markets 
are highly integrated, it might be useful to control for cointegration in the estimation. 
                                                           
11 Throughout the paper, the reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
12 To get a sense of magnitude of coefficient estimate from the Tobit estimation is not straightforward. This is because partial 
effects on mean responses, averaged across the distribution of unobservables, cannot be identified. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 
(2002) suggests an approach to get around this, but given a large number of explanatory variables under consideration in this 
paper, his approach is not practically applicable to our estimation.   12
The robustness of the results with different specifications, and the extent of panel 
cointegration are considered in Table 7, which show the lower- and upper bound of coefficient 
estimates of a series of models nested between the specification (8) and (9). The columns with ‘no 
prior’ are coefficient estimates without controlling for the possibility of panel cointegration in the 
estimation,
13 whereas the columns with ‘high’ are estimates with a prior that trade-financing market is 
highly integrated. As can be seen from Table 7, the coefficient estimates on the interactions between 
Financial-Disruption Indicator with Value of Total Imports and with Value of Banking Claims are 
positive with varying degree of statistical significance for all U.S. banks.
14 Interestingly, the effects of 
the interaction between Financial-Disruption Indicator and Degree of Product Differentiation in 
Imports vary across the bank size: for the trade-financing loans from money-center banks, the effect is 
negative, whereas it is positive for large and small banks. This suggests that during a period of 
systematic banking crises, the links between financing costs and international trade patterns depend on 
the size of the commercial bank of the loan arrangement.
15 
 
3.2.2 Varying the G7-Creditor Type 
Data on trade-financing loans from the G-7 countries allow us to investigate the correlation 
between trade and financing ties and the provision of trade-financing loans by creditor type 
(commercial banks, all- and short-term official creditors). Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates of 
the basic specification using the data on trade-financing loans of all types of the G7 creditors. 
                                                           
13 I follow M. Hashem Pesaran and Ron Smith (1995), that by averaging the data over time and estimating cross-section 
regression on group means, the estimation should provide efficient and consistent estimates of the long-run effects of the 
explanatory variables if there is panel cointegration in the data. 
14 All coefficients reported in lower- and upper-bound are at least at 5-percent level, otherwise zero value reported. 
15 This might be a result of bargaining position of a borrower country and its creditors. Using data on secondary-market prices of 
loans to developing countries from U.S. commercial banks, Fernandez and Ozler (1999) find that countries with higher debt 
concentration (the proportion of a country’s debt held by large banks relative to small banks) have higher secondary-market 
prices of loans. They argue that because the banks’ bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, repayment 
and secondary-market prices will increase with a country’s level of debt concentration. In addition, our result shows that 
disruption in a country’s financial system affects international trade, a finding that is closely related to the study on the link 
between financial development and international trade. Thorsten Beck (2003, (2002)) finds that countries with better-developed 
financial systems have higher export shares and trade balances in industries that use more external finance, suggesting that 
financial development may translate into a comparative advantage in industries that use more external finance. Delving deeper 
into the components (i.e. by industries) of international trade, it is possible that the negative impact of financial disruption on 
international trade is larger for industries that face higher financing costs and depend more on external finance.   13
Table 9 reports lower- and upper-bound of coefficient estimates from the data of the G7 
creditors.  The coefficient estimates on the interactions of Financial-Disruption Indicator with Value 
of Total Imports and with Value of Banking Claims are positive and statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the effects of Financial-Disruption Indicator and its interaction with Degree of Product 
Differentiation in Imports on the amount of trade-financing loans differ across creditor types. The 
effect of Financial-Disruption Indicator is positive for commercial-bank creditor, whereas it is 
negative for official creditor. This seems to suggest that during periods of systematic banking crises, 
there is a substitution away of trade-financing lending from official to commercial-bank creditor
16. The 
interaction between Financial-Disruption Indicator and Degree of Product Differentiation in Imports 
has a negative effect on trade-financing loans in the case of commercial-bank creditor, but none for 
official creditors. That Trade and Financial Ties are less important to the official creditors with respect 
to the commercial-bank creditors seems reasonable since, in recent years, official creditors such as 
export-credit agencies have changed their role from lender to guarantor of trade-financing loans.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Approximately half of world trade is conducted on credit; a supplier gives to its foreign buyer 
a loan financed by commercial banks on both sides of the transaction. For importers, especially in 
developing countries, trade-financing loans from foreign suppliers are an essential source of external 
finance. This paper argues that there are links between financing costs and international trade patterns, 
links that are determined by the strength of trade and financial ties between trading partners. The paper 
presents two sets of evidence, which, apart from the main findings, may bear on other areas of current 
research. 
                                                           
16 Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer (2002) show that since the international debt crisis in the 1980’s, international barter has 
also emerged as an international trade technique, and increases substantially after recent financial crises in Russia and South East 
Asia.   14
First, with respect to price, the industry-level evidence indicates that financing costs 
influences international trade patterns, whereby for each industry the pass-through rates of exchange-
rate changes into import prices are positively correlated with the industry's dependence on external-
finance and trade-credit use.  Essentially, this means financing costs determines international pricing 
behavior.  In the context of the exchange-rate pass-through literature, the findings in this paper 
provides fresh evidence that an industry’s external-finance use and its financing costs have an 
influence on pass-through rates. This knowledge is useful in the implementation of optimal monetary 
policy in open-economy framework. In the context of international trade literature, this paper suggests 
that there are links between a country’s financing costs and source of external finance, and trade 
patterns with its trading partners. Essentially, these imply that financing costs can potentially be an 
important factor in determining the effect of a shift in international trade policy (such as anti-dumping- 
and import tariffs policy) as well as a change in monetary policy (i.e. exchange rate and interest rate 
policy)
17.  For example, together with a recent finding of Carmen M. Reinhart et al. (2003a) that 
dollarization does appear to increase exchange rate pass-through, the findings in this paper suggest that 
variation across industries of pass-through rates and linkages between inflation and exchange rate 
changes, might depend on level of an industry’s external-finance use, dollar debts, and financing costs. 
Further, the results are relevant in explaining how industries with differing levels of dependence on 
external finance and trade credit respond to financial disruption in their country’s financial sector. As 
an example, the recent credit crunch in Argentina had only limited negative effects on firms in the 
agricultural industry (producer of grains), which generally do not have access to bank financing, but 
instead, have suppliers’ credits on barter basis. 
Second, with respect to volume, the country-level evidence suggests that between trading partners the 
higher volume of trade-financing loans depends positively on the strength of trade and financial ties, 
                                                           
17 For closely related research on these, see for example, Robert C. Feenstra (1989) on how import tariffs and exchange rate 
symmetrically affect import prices; Bruce A. Blonigen and Stephen E. Haynes (2002) on how imposition of an anti-dumping 
duty may influence firm’s pricing decisions which lead to structural breaks in exchange rate pass-through; Won Chang and L. 
Alan Winters (2002) on how the setup of regional trade agreement may influence import-and export-prices; Paul R. Bergin and 
Robert C. Feenstra (2001) on how a firm’s price-setting behavior plays an important role in an open-economy macroeconomic 
model; Michael W. Klein et al. (2002) on how financial difficulties at banks were economically important in reducing the 
number of foreign direct investment projects by Japanese firms into the United States.   15
including the higher value of total imports, the higher degree of product differentiation in imports, and 
the higher value of banking claims. Interestingly, a study of trade-financing loans during periods of 
systematic banking crises suggests that the links between financing costs and international trade 
patterns also depend on characteristics of the loan arrangements (i.e. maturity), size of the commercial 
banks (i.e. money-center, large, or small), and type of creditors (i.e. commercial bank or official). 
Besides the implications regarding the bargaining positions between a borrower country and its 
creditors, the analyses also emphasize the notion that in order to resolve international debt problem, 
financial policy cannot be separated from a country’s international trade. During a debt crisis and other 
financial disruption in a country’s financial system, external finance for investment in highly trade-
dependent sectors may be warranted.  As Joshua Aizenman (1991) suggests, this would reduce 
economic dislocation of the debtor country and increase future repayments to its creditors. As Jeremy 
I. Bulow (2002) puts it, the ultimate goal of any debt policy should be to foster trade and enhance 
efficient investment, but not to maximize capital flows. To achieve these goals, this paper affirms that 
we must not only recognize that financing costs and level of debt intolerance differ among countries 
(Carmen M. Reinhart et al. (2003b)), but we must also try to understand linkages between trade and 
finance in different parts of the economy. 
 
Appendix A: Stylized Facts of Financing Costs and Trade Financing 
There is a large literature indicating that development of a country’s financial sector 
positively influences the level and the rate of growth of per capita income. Interestingly, the positive 
influence of financial sector development is found to vary with financial dependence across industries 
and across countries, suggesting a link between financing costs and international trade pattern
18.  
Historically, trade-financing loans were subsidized by governments of industrial countries, 
usually through the so-called ‘export credit agency’
19, and were widely used for imports of capital 
goods as a part of large industrial projects in developing countries. Pressured by criticisms of its cost 
                                                           
18 Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998) find that during 1980’s the industrial sectors in a large number of countries that 
are relatively more dependent on external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial 
sectors. Raymond Fisman and Inessa Love (2003) find that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing have 
disproportionately higher growth rates in countries with weaker financial sectors. If international trade patterns are determined 
by comparative advantage of a country, these findings of the link between financial dependence and industry growth across 
countries would imply that a disruption in the financial sector that affects a country’s source of external finance could also 
negatively influence an industry comparative advantage. 
19 Major export credit agencies are the US Export-Import Bank, the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) of Germany the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the United Kingdom, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 
and the Canadian Export Development Corporation (EDC).   16
ineffective and subsidized trade-financing activities, export credit agencies of the OECD countries 
agreed in 1992 to maintain some floor level of trade-financing interest rates, and to focus their role as 
guarantors of trade-financing loans. As a result, trade financing has gradually been done less by 
government agencies, and more by capital markets. 
In order to get a better picture of trade financing for international trade, let us look at basic 
features of trade financing loans. For a simple arrangement of trade-financing loans, after a foreign 
supplier contracts to supply goods to an importer, there is a parallel loan agreement in which a 
“negotiating” bank in the supplier country lends to an “issuing” bank in the importer country.
20  
An example of trade-financing loans
21 
Loan: Citigroup puts together a trade-financing loan to fund the purchase of 1,072 Volvo buses by 
Mexico's IAMSA group. The overall finance amounts to US$223 million consisting of commercial 
facility of US$125.7 million and the Swedish Export Guarantee Board or Export Kredit Namnden 
(EKN) supported term loan facilities of US$97.2 million. 
Lender, Borrower, Guarantor: Lender of record is the Swedish Export Credit Corporation (SEK). 
Borrower of record is Promotora de Proyectos Terrestres. The commercial contract is between IAMSA 
and its subsidiaries and Volvo Buses de Mexico. The IAMSA group, consisting of IAMSA and 
subsidiaries and the entities forming part of OMnibus de Mexico, Grupo Flecha Amarilla and Grupo 
Toluca, represents the leading group of bus operators in Mexico encompasses 22% of the Mexican 
industry fleet and transports 20% of the 2.1 billion passengers transported annually in the country. The 
deal has 100% political and 90% commercial risk cover from the Swedish agencies. 
Repayment: The financing of the acquisition of these 1,702 buses represents the majority of the 
IAMSA group's fleet renewal program for the years 2002-2005. There is an eight-year tenor overall -- 
with final maturity mid-2010. Deliveries of the buses is over three years, and this is accommodated by 
tranching both facilities into four tranches with five years repayment per tranche. 
Because a foreign supplier and/or its export credit agency has to accept delayed payment and, 
thus, bears all risks of non-repaying (i.e., commercial- and political-risks), it will normally try to 
transfer most of the risk to capital markets through a specialized financing technique called forfaiting
22. 
Another feature of trade financing is that since trade-financing loans are tied with the purchase of 
imported goods, and are a source of inexpensive financing, it has often been argued in the business 




Appendix B: A formal model of trade and financial ties. 
Trade and Financing: Basic Setup 
                                                           
20 In recent years there has been an increasing volume of trade financing through syndicated loans of large international banks. 
Typically, a lead bank (also called mandated arranger) acts as a negotiating bank to syndicate loans from other banks. A lead 
bank may also be a guarantor. Normally, an export credit agency of the supplier country will be a guarantor of trade-financing 
loans. 
 
21 This example is drawn from Trade Finance Magazine (December, 2002). 
22 According to a recent estimate, activities in the market that is devoted to international trade financing are worth around 
US$700 billion a year (the Economist (January 4th, 2002)). A mechanic of forfaiting is non-recourse sale by the foreign supplier 
of bank-guaranteed promissory notes, bills of exchange, or similar documents received from an importer. The foreign supplier 
receives cash at the time of the transaction by selling the notes or bills at a discount from their face value to a specialized finance 
firm called a forfaiter. Although the foreign supplier is responsible for the quality of her goods, she receives a clear and 
unconditional cash payment at the time of the transaction. 
23 For example, from the Global Investing Section of the Financial Times: “Government can reschedule their bonds and it affects 
their sovereign rating but if you don’t pay your trade obligations your imports dry up.” (Alison Beard (August 30th, 2001)). In 
addition, the moral hazard problem seems to be less likely as compared to other types of international borrowing such as bonds 
and other types of loans. The foreign supplier can threaten to cut off future supplies in the event of the importer’s actions that 
reduce the chances of repayment. Of course, the importer has a recourse option to import from alternative foreign suppliers. This 
is a part of what we examine shortly in the theoretical model.   17
This appendix presents a conceptual framework modeling international exchange 
characterized by separation between the quid and the quo, such as trade-financing loan, contracts for 
future delivery, collateral, and insurance
24. Consider trade and financial ties in an international 
economy populated by entrepreneurs (buyers) and potential foreign suppliers. Let us refer to each of 
the former and of the latter by he and she, respectively. Each entrepreneur has a project, which requires 
an imported good from foreign suppliers. The economy and the project lasts for two periods and three-
date: date-0 to date-2. 
The value of the imported good is $1, and is made in two deliveries: an amount α  on date-0 
and another  α − 1  on date-1, where  1 0 ≤ ≤α . The imported good requires one period for 
installation, after which it can be used in the project until date-2.  
Let  y + 1 , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ y , be a riskless cash flow from using each $1 worth of the 
imported good. On each date, if the entrepreneur works on his project, he can earn this cash flow 
proportional to amount of the imported good available on that date. That is, his project will generate a 
cash flow of 0 on date-0,  () y + 1 α  on date-1, and  y + 1  on date-2. Note that the investment of the 
entrepreneur in his project is observable and contractible to the foreign supplier: the trade-financing 
loan is tied with delivery of the imported good, and the entrepreneur cannot divert trade-financing loan 
to other uses. 
The entrepreneurs need a trade-financing loan from foreign suppliers. A trade contract 
between an entrepreneur and a foreign supplier not only specifies a schedule of deliveries of the good, 
but also includes terms of a required trade-financing loan repayment. The required repayment is 
denoted by  p + 1 , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ p , and it is to be made after date-0 delivery (α ) is arrived, but 
before date-1 delivery ( α − 1 ). 
Suppose that the foreign supplier’s cost of producing $1 worth of imported good equals 1, and 
the entrepreneur’s willingness to pay for this imported good is  v + 1 , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ v . Then, the 
required trade-financing loan repayment,  p + 1 , can be found such that (i)  1 1 ≥ + p : cost of 
production is covered by repayment, (ii)  v p + ≤ + 1 1 : entrepreneurs are willing to repay, and (iii) 
() y p + ≤ + 1 1 α : date-1 cash flow from the project is sufficient to repay the trade-financing loan. 
Limited Commitment with Trade and Financial Ties 
A date-0 foreign supplier to the project has been in trade and financial relationship with the 
entrepreneur since a beginning of the project, and thus develops specific skills in supplying the 
entrepreneur. Let us call this date-0 foreign supplier the relationship supplier. 
There is a limitation on willingness of any potential relationship supplier to provide trade-
financing loans. After date-0 imported good (α ) is delivered, the entrepreneur cannot commit to make 
his required repayment ( p + 1 ) to the relationship supplier. By not repaying, the entrepreneur can still 
generate a date-1 cash flow of () y + 1 α , by using date-0 delivery in his project, and then use the date-
1 cash flow to finance recourse to import the good equals to date-1 delivery from other foreign 
suppliers. 
Other potential foreign suppliers who come after date-0 to replace the relationship supplier, 
know less than the relationship supplier on how to supply to the ongoing project of the entrepreneur. 
                                                           
24 Avner Greif (2002) offers an historical account of such a separation between the quid and the quo for trade during the late 
Medieval period. The structure of a model of trade and financial ties in this section borrows partly from a model of liquidity and 
banking of Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001) and a model of international barter of Dalia Marin and Monika 
Schnitzer (2003). In order to focus on stylized fact of trade-financing arrangement and to organize data for empirical test, I 
model (1) exporter and its bank together as foreign supplier and (2) the importer and its bank as domestic entrepreneur. See 
Vicente Cunat (2002) for a model where the supplier competes in lending with the bank, and Mikhail M. Klimenko (2002) for a 
model where the level of openness, variety of product differentiation, and market power in international trade with the rest of the 
world of a debtor country may influence its bargaining position with its privates creditors and international financial institutions. 
Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan (1997) provide a comprehensive study on corporate’ use of trade credits.   18
Let us call any of these potential foreign suppliers the unskilled supplier. Suppose that for each $1 
worth of date-2 cash flow to be earned by the entrepreneur, if the date-1 delivery was supplied by the 
relationship supplier, he can earn only E s − 1 , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ E s , if he imports the date-1 delivery 
from the unskilled supplier. 
For the entrepreneur, a difference in date-2 cash flow generated by using the imported good in 
the project, between (a) repaying trade-financing loan and getting the date-1 delivery from the 
relationship supplier, and (b) not repaying the loan and getting the date-1 delivery from the unskilled 
supplier is: 
(3)  Date-2 cash flow = 











  ; relationship supplier 
; unskilled supplier   
As for the relationship supplier, in the event of non-repayment she can cancel date-1 
delivery() α − 1 , and sell to other entrepreneurs in the world market. Since her good is specifically 
made for the entrepreneur’s ongoing project, it would not be as productive if it were used in other 
projects. As a result, the most that she can expect to get in return from supplying the date-1 delivery to 
the world market instead will be () ( )( ) α − + − 1 1 1 p sS , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ S s , which is less than the 
amount that she can get, () () α − + 1 1 p , if the entrepreneur services his repayment obligation. 
Recall from the stylized facts on trade financing that a trade-financing loan is an obligation 
that an issuing bank of the entrepreneur has to repay to a negotiating bank of the relationship supplier. 
In the event of non-repayment, the negotiating bank can seize as collateral the banking assets of the 
issuing bank accessible to the negotiating bank. Essentially, this means that the larger the financial ties 
(i.e. cross-border banking claims) between the negotiating bank and the issuing bank, the more 
banking assets that can be seized to repay the relationship supplier if the entrepreneur fails to service 
his repayment obligation
25.  
Let β  be the value of such assets that can be seized in the event of non-repayment, where 
1 0 ≤ ≤ β . Under limited commitment to repay, the relationship supplier is willing to provide a trade-
financing loan only if in the event that the entrepreneur fails to repay, a total value that she can get 
from selling date-1 delivery to the world market and seizing the banking assets of the issuing bank, is 
sufficient to cover her total cost of production: 
(4)  () ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 ≥ + − + − β α p sS  
 From the above condition, three implications follow. First, in the event of non-repayment by 
the entrepreneur, the relationship supplier’s loss in the value of her good ( a fraction,  S s − 1 ) cannot be 
too large. This means that the more differentiated the imported good (because of its specificity to the 
project), the larger the loss to the relationship supplier.  
Second, it is risky for the relationship supplier to engage in a one-time sale () 1 = α  and 
provide a trade-financing loan to the entrepreneur. This implies that the larger the volume of 
continuing trade, which can be measured by the value of total imports, the less risky for the 
relationship supplier to provide the loan. Third, if a value of the banking assets that can be seized as 
collateral is sufficiently large relative to the total cost of production (i.e. 1 = β ), an incentive condition 
of the relationship supplier to provide the loan is easily satisfied. 
 
 
                                                           
25 Such assets could also represent insurance covered by the government’s export credit agency.  Malcolm Stephens (1998) notes 
that, unfortunately, exporters, banks, and investors seem not to have been sufficiently concerned about risks in South East Asia 
as to seek export credit agency cover before a recent East-Asian financial crisis.   19
Time line of events thus far is: 
Date-0 Date-1 Date-2 
1. Supplier agrees to sell to 
entrepreneur an imported good. 
The good is to be delivered at 
Date-0 and Date-1. 
2. Banks on both sides agree on 
trade-financing loan contract. 
3. Supplier delivers Date-0 
fraction of the imported good 
and acquires specific skills in 
making and supplying the good 
to entrepreneur through 
relationship. 
1. Relationship supplier delivers 
Date-1 fraction of the imported 
good if entrepreneur repays 
trade-financing loan; otherwise 
she sells the good to world 
market with loss due to 
specificity of the good. 
2. Entrepreneur makes a 
repayment and receives the 
Date-1 delivery, or he defaults 
and uses cash-flow generated by 
Date-0 delivery of imported 
good to recourse to other 
suppliers. 
1. Entrepreneur generates Date-
2 cash-flow by either (1) (if he 
repaid ) using all imported good 
from the relationship supplier or 
(2) (if he defaulted) using a 
mixed of imported good from 
two suppliers (relationship 
supplier and unskilled supplier) 
and suffering a loss due to 
specificity of the imported 
good. 
2. If entrepreneur defaulted on 
Date-1, negotiating bank of 
relationship supplier seizes as 
collateral banking assets of 
issuing bank of entrepreneur. 
 
Proposition 1:  Under limited commitment to repay, the amount of trade-financing loans 
that the relationship supplier is willing to provide to the entrepreneur is: 
-  Positively correlated with value of total imports by the entrepreneur  
-  Positively correlated with value of banking claims that the entrepreneur’s issuing bank 
owes to the supplier’s negotiating bank (increasing with β ) 
-  Negatively correlated with degree of product differentiation in  imports (increasing with 
S s ) 
 
The present value of cash flows of the entrepreneur if the entrepreneur fails to service 
repayment obligation is: 
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If the entrepreneur repays his trade-financing loan, a present value of cash flows that will be 
generated is: 
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Two implications follow. First, similar to the incentive condition to provide trade-financing, 
the above condition suggests that repayment incentive is easier to satisfy when value of total imports   20
by the entrepreneur and value of the entrepreneur’s issuing bank assets in reach of the supplier’s 
negotiating bank (as represented by β ) are large. 
Second, the degree of product differentiation in imports (as represented by E s ) influences the 
repayment incentive. Interestingly, the more differentiated the good, the greater the repayment 
incentive; it is more difficult for the entrepreneur to find other foreign suppliers to replace the 
relationship supplier, and thus his present value of cash flows suffers more when  E s  is large. 
 
Proposition 2: Under limited commitment to repay, the entrepreneur’s incentive to repay is: 
-  Positively correlated with value of total imports 
-  Positively correlated with value of banking claims that the entrepreneur’s issuing bank 
owes to the supplier’s negotiating bank (increasing with β ) 
-  Positively correlated with degree of product differentiation in  imports (increasing with 
E s ) 
To summarize: 
Observable quantities of 
interest  Parameters  Effects on trade-
financing loans  Ties 
Value of total imports  α − 1   + Trade 
Value of banking claims  β   + Financial 
Degree of product 
differentiation in imports  { } E S i si , ; =   ±   Trade/Financial 
 
 
Appendix C: List of countries in the sample 
Emerging markets: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Angola, Argentina*, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahrain*, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bermuda*, Bhutan, Bolivia*, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil*, Brunei, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon*, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile*, China*, Colombia*, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Costa Rica*, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic*, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic*, Ecuador*, Egypt*, El Salvador*, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia*, 
Falkland Islands, Fiji, Gabon*, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana*, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala*, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong*, Hungary*, India*, Indonesia*, Iran*, Iraq*, 
Israel*, Jamaica*, Jordan*, Kazakhstan, Kenya*, Korea*, Kuwait*, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, 
Lebanon*, Lesotho, Liberia*, Libya, Lithuania, Macao*, Macedonia*, Madagascar, Malawi*, 
Malaysia*, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico*, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco*, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua*, Niger, 
Nigeria*, Oman*, Pakistan*, Panama*, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay*, Peru*, Philippines, Poland*, 
Qatar*, Romania*, Russia*, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore*, Slovakia*, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa*, 
Sri Lanka*, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grens, Sudan*, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria*, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand*, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago*, Tunisia*, Turkey*, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay*, Vanuatu, Venezuela*, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia*, Zimbabwe 
Industrial countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Note:  Data for the U.S. banks’ trade financing are available only for countries with * and 
industrial countries.   21
Appendix D: Variables and Data Source 
Variables Description 
Industry-Level Data 
Financing-Cost Measures   
Dependence on Trade-Credit Use  [(capital expenditures - cash flow from operations) / capital expenditures] for four
firms in the 1980’s, old firms in the 1980’s, young firms in the 1980’s, and all firm
constructed from the data of the U.S. companies over the 1980’s in Standard and P
Source: Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998) 
Dependence on External-Finance Use  (i) a stock measure of dependence on trade credits: [accounts payable / total assets
dependence on trade credits: [change in accounts payable / change in total assets],
of dependence on external finance: [(total assets - retained earnings) - total assets]
data of the U.S. companies over the 1980’s in Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT.
Source: Raymond Fisman and Inessa Love (2003) 
Import Prices  Quarterly indexes disaggregated into the four-digit SIC. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on-line databases. http://www.bls.g
accessed on August 30, 2003 
Exchange Rates  Inverse of the U.S. nominal effective exchange rates (i.e. an increase is dollar depr
nominal effective exchange rates are averages of the monthly exchange rate series
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) series [neu] by the International M
Volatility of Exchange Rates  Three-month rolling standard deviations of the monthly nominal effective exchang
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) series [neu] by the International M
Industry Concentration  Two-digit SIC industries’ Herfindahl-Herschmann Index (HHI) from the 1992 sur
SIC industry, the HHI index is calculated by summing the squares of the individua
for the 50 largest companies or the universe, whichever is lower, in the industry. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. On-line databases: http://www.census.gov/epcd/w
accessed on August 30, 2003. 
Industry Inventory to Shipments  Quarterly inventory to shipments for each two-digit SIC industry, averaged from t
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census. On-line databases: 
http://www.census.gov/indicator/www/m3/hist/m3bendoc.htm, accessed on Augu
  
Country-Level Data 
Trade-Financing Loans   
U.S. Commercial Banks  Quarterly stock of commercial-bank trade credits from the U.S. to industrial and d
available for all commercial banks (money-center, large, and small) from Septemb
2002. Money-center banks include Bank of America Corp., Bank One Corp., Taun
Chase & Co., and Citigroup. Large banks include Bank of New York Co., Wachov
Financial Corp., HSBC Holdings PLC, and State Street Corp.. 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)-Country Exp
and Country Exposure Information Report (E.16)  
G7 Creditors  Bi-annual stock of trade credits from G7 to developing countries, available for com
official creditors from 1991 to 2002. The data is the aggregate of trade credits from
that since most of trade-financing loans are provided by large industrial countries,
credit agencies or by international banks and their subsidiaries, it is reasonable, giv
data, to match trade-financing loans with international trade data of G7 countries.
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
Trade and Financial Ties   
Value of Imports  Value of total imports from the creditor/exporter country (US, G7) by the borrowe
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-Mont
Statistics. http://sourceoecd.org 
Value of Banking Claims  Value of cross-border banking claims the borrower/importer country owes to the c
Source: FFIEC-E16 for the U.S. commercial banks and from BIS for the G7-credi
Degree of Product Differentiation in Imports  [total value of the imports of differentiated products / (total value of imports of org
+ total value of imports of reference-priced goods)] averaged over the sample peri
U.S. commercial-bank case, and 1991-2002 for the G7-creditors case), using good  22
E. Rauch (1999). 
Financial Disruption  Dummy variable equal to one for periods of a systematic banking crisis, construct
episodes of systematic banking crises since 1975. 
Source: Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel (2003) 
Public Debts in Banking Claims  Percentage of public debts in banking claims by each bank size (U.S. data) and cre
Source: Same as data for Trade-Financing Loans 
Short-Term Debts in Banking Claims  Percentage of short-term debts in banking claims by each bank size (U.S. data) an
Source: Same as data for Trade-Financing Loans 
Number of Previous Participation in Paris Club 
Negotiation 
Number of previous participation in Paris Club negotiation, constructed from date
Negotiation 
Source: http://www.clubdeparis.org  
Regional Free Trade Agreement Participation  Dummy variable equal to one if a debtor country participates in a regional free tra
trade agreement dummies include EEC/EC/EU, US-Israel FTA, NAFTA, CARICO
ANZCERTA, MERCOSUR. 
Source: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/, accessed on May 28, 2003. 
Distance from Trading Partners  distance between the borrower/importer country and the creditor/exporter country
Source: Same as data for Regional Free Trade Agreement Participation   23
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3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment  -1.33 0.05 0.04 0.07 585
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus  -1.33 0.05 0.04 0.07 1110
3679 Electronic Components -1.33 0.05 0.05 0.07 414
3531 Construction Machinery and Equipment  -0.18 0.10 0.08 0.10 777
3621 Motors and Generators  -0.05 0.11 0.13 0.07 447
3699 Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies -0.02 0.12 0.09 0.07 180
3724 Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts  -0.02 0.12 0.17 0.10 2378
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment -0.02 0.12 0.19 0.10 772
3714 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories  0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 943
3537 Industrial Trucks, Tractors, Trailers, and Stackers  0.14 0.08 0.05 0.12 597
3711 Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.10 2676
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices  0.14 0.10 0.05 0.07 541
2899 Chemicals and Chemical Preparations 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.07 190
3569 General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 0.25 0.09 0.12 0.12 102
3823 Industrial Instruments for Control of Process Variables 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.04 256
3825 Instruments for Testing of Electrical Signals  0.25 0.09 0.14 0.04 401
3841 Surgical and Medical Instruments  0.25 0.09 0.14 0.04 243
3559 Special Industry Machinery 0.33 0.09 0.13 0.12 80
3829 Measuring and Controlling Devices 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.04 148
Note: Import price is the quarterly import price index for each SIC industry in the U.S.. HHI index is the Herfindahl-Herschmann Index for each 
SIC industry. External-finance use is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for old U.S. firms in the same industry 
between 1980-1990. Trade-credit use measures the fraction of purchases on credits for U.S. firms in the same industry between 1980-1990. 
Inventory to shipments ratio is the quarterly inventory to shipments for each SIC industry in the U.S..
Table 1: Pattern of dependence on external-finance use and variations in import prices, industry inventory to shipments, and market concentration 
across industries in the United States during 1980-1990
Description SIC




25(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged import prices 0.946 0.940 0.956 0.927
(0.013)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.014)**
Exchange rates -0.009 -0.012 -0.029 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022)
interactions of exchange rates with:
 × Volatility 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)** (0.002)
 × HHI index -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)**
 × External-finance use:
all firms in 1980 -0.003
(0.001)**
young firms in 1980 -0.004
(0.002)*
old firms in 1980 0.017
(0.004)**
all firms in 1970 0.004
(0.001)*
Observations 611 583 422 417
Differential in pass-through rates -0.132 -0.620 0.577 0.067
Table 2: Import prices response to exchange rate changes
Dependence on external-finance use
Note: The dependent variable is the quarterly import price index for each SIC industry in the U.S.. 
Exchange rate is an inverse of the quarterly U.S.'s nominal effective exchange rates. Volatility is the 
3-month rolling standard deviation of the U.S. exchange rates. HHI index is the Herfindahl-
Herschmann Index for each SIC industry. External-finance use is the fraction of capital expenditures 
not financed with internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry between 1980-1990. Differential 
in pass-through rates measure (in percentage terms) how much of changes in exchange rate pass-
through into import prices of an industry at the 4th quartile level of financial dependence with respect 
to an industry at the 1th quartile level of financial dependence. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
**(*) signifies statistically significant at 1%(5%). Controlling variables not reported here are year 
dummies and values of industry inventory to shipments.
26(5) (6) (7)
Lagged import prices 0.947 0.954 0.955
(0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)**
Exchange rates 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
interactions of exchange rates with:
 × Volatility -0.028 -0.005 -0.002
(0.005)** (0.002)** (0.001)
 × HHI index 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
 × Trade-credit use:
1-(retained earnings/total assets) 0.056
(0.010)**
accounts payable/total assets 0.010
(stock measure) (0.002)**
account payable/total assets 0.004
(flow measure) (0.001)**
Observations 724 724 724
Differential in pass-through rates 0.435 0.054 0.073
Table 3: Import prices response to exchange rate changes
Dependence on trade-credit use
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly import price index for each SIC industry in the 
U.S.. Exchange rate is an inverse of the monthly U.S.'s nominal effective exchange rates. 
Volatility is the 3-month rolling standard deviation of the U.S. exchange rates. HHI index is the 
Herfindahl-Herschmann Index for each SIC industry. Trade-credit use measures the fraction of 
purchases on credits for U.S. firms in the same industry between 1980-1990. Differential in 
pass-through rates measure (in percentage terms) how much of changes in exchange rate pass-
through into import prices of an industry at the 4th quartile level of financial dependence with 
respect to an industry at the 1th quartile level of financial dependence. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. **(*) signifies statistically significant at 1%(5%). Controlling variables not 








(million US$) (million US$) (%) (million US$)
Korea 76,244 41,186 19 175,796
4th Brazil 58,056 26,883 3 338,299
Mexico 41,541 171,578 10 401,210
Venezuela 5,827 10,396 11 69,662
3rd Dominican Republic 5,741 7,744 15 14,349
Guatemala 5,699 3,483 19 19,368
Sweden 1,729 6,995 3 110,469
2nd Belgium 1,616 24,599 4 183,301
Jordan 1,473 636 42 1,947
Nicaragua 366 704 26 1,369
1st Denmark 191 3,013 9 109,712
Ghana 173 395 31 1,213
Note: Only top three countries for each quartile are reported. Trade-financing loans is the quarterly 
amount of trade-financing loans from the U.S. Money-center banks to each debtor country from 
September 1997 to June 2002. Imports is a value of total imports from the U.S. to each debtor 
country. Product diff. is a degree of product differentiation in imports, measured as the averages 
over September 1997 to June 2002 of the ratio of imports of differentiated products to imports of 
reference priced- and organized exchange- products as classified by James Rauch (1999). Banking 
Claims is a value of banking assets measured as unadjusted cross-border claims by each debtor 
country.










(million US$) (%) (%) (%)
China 237,461 54 16 46
4th Russia 223,426 42 1 58
Indonesia 181,644 49 13 51
Congo Republic 14,382 36 4 64
3rd Kenya 13,163 46 16 54
Czech Republic 12,247 45 25 55
Belarus 2,751 74 7 26
2nd Bahrain 2,707 78 13 22
Senegal 2,671 14 33 86
Brunei 511 0 57 100
1st Libya 503 0 37 100
Mongolia 500 24 24 76
Note: Only top three countries for each quartile are reported. Trade-financing loans is the bi-annual 
amount of trade-financing loans from G7-creditors to each debtor country from January 1991 to 
December 2001.
Table 5: Trade-financing loans from the G7-creditors, January 1991 to December 2001







Financial Disruption × Imports 0.13
(0.08)
Product diff.: 0.39 0.34
(0.04)** (0.04)**
Financial Disruption × Product diff. -0.38
(0.07)**
Banking Claims: 0.64 0.38
(0.22)** (0.15)*
Financial Disruption × Banking Claims 0.04
(0.08)
Public debt in Banking Claims -0.28 -0.19
(0.07)** (0.05)**
Short-Term debt in Banking Claims -0.35 -0.23
(0.11)** (0.11)*
Observations 1865 1865
Table 6: Determinants of Trade-Financing Loans
Trade-financing loans from U.S. Money-center banks
Note: Dependent variable is quarterly amount of trade-financing loans from the U.S. Money-center 
banks to each debtor country from September 1997 to June 2002. Financial Disruption is a dummy 
variable equals to one if a country was in a period of systematic banking crisis. Imports is a value of 
total imports from the U.S. to each debtor country. Product diff. is a degree of product differentiation 
in imports, measured as the averages over September 1997 to June 2002 of the ratio of imports of 
differentiated products to imports of reference priced- and organized exchange- products as classified 
by James Rauch (1999). Banking Claims is a value of banking claims measured as unadjusted cross-
border claims by each debtor country. Public debt (Short-Term debt) in Banking Claims is a value of 
portion of the cross-border claims by public sector (with maturity less than one year). All variables are 
in natural logs. Controlling variables not reported are history of Paris-Club negotiation, distance from 
the U.S., regional free trade agreement and year dummies. Pooled-Tobit estimation with IV applies to 
Imports and Banking Claims. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **(*) signifies 1%(5%).
30Key : lower upper lower upper
Imports 0.31 0.40 0.00 0.00
money-center 0.54 0.68 0.00 1.16
large 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
small 0.40 0.62 0.00 0.00
Product diff. 0.26 0.30 0.00 0.27
money-center 0.32 0.41 0.00 0.33
large 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00
small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking Claims 0.53 0.72 0.00 1.60
money-center 0.41 0.81 1.60 2.76
large 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00
small 0.83 0.99 0.00 0.00
Doubtful : lower upper lower upper
Financial Disruption -1.44 0.00 -3.02 -2.00
money-center -1.08 0.00 -2.45 -1.63
large -1.91 -0.88 -1.96 0.00
small -1.04 -0.27 0.00 0.00
Financial Disruption × Imports 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.32
money-center 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
large -0.25 0.19 0.00 0.00
small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28
Financial Disruption × Product diff. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
money-center -0.41 -0.21 -0.40 0.00
large 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.44
small 0.29 0.41 0.00 0.00
Financial Disruption × Banking Claims 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.28
money-center 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
large 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.30
small 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.29
Table 7: Lower and Upper bounds of coefficient estimates: Determinants of Trade-financing loans 
from U.S. commercial banks
Note: Specification search of models nested between the model (8) and (9) of Table 6. All of the 
estimates reported below are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Prior on integration of trade financing market
high no prior






Financial Disruption × Imports 0.09
(0.10)
Product diff.: 0.10 0.15
(0.06) (0.05)**
Financial Disruption × Product diff. 0.22
(0.11)*
Banking Claims: 0.88 0.79
(0.32)** (0.15)**
Financial Disruption × Banking Claims 0.01
(0.07)
Public debt in Banking Claims 0.44 0.37
(0.28) (0.13)**
Short-Term debt in Banking Claims 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.07)
Observations 1525 1525
Table 8: Determinants of Trade-financing Loans
Trade-financing loans from all G7-creditors
Note: Dependent variable is bi-annual amount of trade-financing loans from G7-countries to borrower 
country from January 1991 to December 2001. Financial Disruption is a dummy variable equals to 
one if a country was in a period of systematic banking crisis. Imports is a value of total imports from 
the G7-countries to each debtor country. Product diff. is a degree of product differentiation in imports, 
measured as the averages over January 1991 to December 2001 of the ratio of imports of 
differentiated products to imports of reference priced- and organized exchange- products as classified 
by James Rauch (1999). Banking Claims is a value of banking claims measured as unadjusted cross-
border claims by each debtor country. Public debt (Short-Term debt) in Banking Claims is a value the 
cross-border claims by public sector (with maturity less than one year). All variables are in natural 
logs. Controlling variables not reported are history of Paris-Club negotiation, distance, regional free 
trade agreement and year dummies. Pooled-Tobit estimation with IV applies to Imports and Banking 
Claims. Robust standard errors in parentheses.**(*) signifies 1%(5%).
32Key : lower upper lower upper
Imports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank -1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
non-bank -1.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 1.44 1.09 1.17
Product diff. 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
non-bank 0.36 0.41 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking Claims 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.60
Bank 0.00 1.55 0.91 1.01
non-bank 0.83 1.79 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
Doubtful : lower upper lower upper
Financial Disruption -0.98 -0.43 0.00 0.00
Bank 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.00
non-bank -1.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial Disruption × Imports 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
Bank 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00
non-bank 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.00
Financial Disruption × Product diff. 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00
Bank -0.22 -0.12 0.00 0.00
non-bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial Disruption × Banking Claims 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Bank 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00
non-bank 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
   < 1 year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 9: Lower and Upper bounds of coefficient estimates: Determinants of Trade-financing loans 
from G7-creditors
Note: Specification search of models nested between the model (10) and (11) of Table 8. All of the 
estimates reported below are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Prior on integration of trade financing market
high no prior













































(1) Importer and Exporter agree on commercial contract 



































































(6) Negotiating bank presents draft and documents. 
Issuing bank promises to pay in t days and returns 
the accepted draft 



















































(3) Issuing bank sends L/C to negotiating bank 
(7) Negotiating bank  
sells the accepted draft to 
forfeiter/public investor 
(10) Forfaiter presents 
the accepted draft and is 
paid by issuing bank 
Figure A: Time line of standard arrangement of trade-financing loan 